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ABSTRACT: I am interested in three questions that arise when one wants to deploy the idea of 
“rules of inference” which don’t reduce to logical truths, questions whose significance will 
become salient if we compare the two slightly different proposals that have been made by David 
Hitchcock and Stephen Toulmin. The three questions I’m interested in are these:  
a) What form should the statements that express such rules take? For example, in 
Hitchcock’s account,  they typically have the form of a certain kind of “covering 
generalization” which contains no explicit normative expressions. In Toulmin’s, when 
warrants are “made more explicit” (Toulmin 2003 [1958]: 91) normative expressions 
occur in them. 
b) What virtues must arguments and inferences have if they are to be considered valid? 
Should we say that they must be truth-preserving? Or, with “inductive” arguments in 
mind, should we say that they must at least be such that it’s unlikely that their 
conclusions are false given that their premisses are true?  But what about the possibility 
of “practical” arguments and inferences whose conclusions are intentions or prescriptions 
–  things whose “propriety” does not consist in their being true?  Should we say, using an 
expression drawn from Brandom, that what matters about inferences is whether they are 
entitlement-preserving?  
c) What virtues must rule statements have if they are to be fit to serve as norms for 
evaluating arguments and inferences? How we answer this question will, of course, 
depend very much on how we answer the preceding question.  Hitchcock, for example, 
takes rules to be covering generalizations of a certain sort and often (though not always) 
appears to take truth to be the sole virtue such generalizations need if they are to confer 
validity on arguments. Toulmin, on the other hand, typically says that warrants must be 
reliable, and that they derive their “authority” from backing which shows that they are 
reliable. Such a conception might lead us in a quite different direction, and might 
possibly prove more robust.  
The paper has five parts. 
 
1. WHAT FORM OUGHT WARRANTS TO TAKE? HITCHCOCK’S ACCOUNT 
 
Hitchcock’s account, as developed in a series of papers from 1985 to 1998, is reviewed and 
explained. In that account, one or more potential warrants can be extracted from any argument or 
inference containing “repeated content expressions,” by generating “a covering generalization” 
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formed by quantifying over one or more repeated context expressions in its “associated 
conditional.” 
 
2. WHAT VIRTUES SHOULD ARGUMENTS AND RULES OF INFERENCE HAVE? 
 
Hitchcock’s account is used to bring into focus questions concerning the virtues we should 
demand of rules of inference. Reflection on Hitchcock-type covering generalizations reveals 
several different “virtues” which might be thought to make such generalizations fit to serve as 
rules of inference – e.g., that they be true of the actual world, true in all “logically” possible 
worlds, true in all “semantically” possible worlds or true in all “nomically” possible worlds. 
None of these potential virtues appears to suffice. 
Moreover, since there are good arguments which are not truth-preserving, none of the 
virtues considered so far would seem to be a necessary condition on rules of inference either. 
 
3. AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF ARGUMENT VIRTUE 
 
The common idea that arguments and inferences provide justification for their conclusions is 
unpacked as follows. An argument justifies its conclusion if and only if it shows1 that it is 
reasonable to embrace (perhaps to assert) that conclusion, given that its premisses are reasonable 
to accept. An inference justifies its conclusion if and only if it makes it reasonable to embrace 
(perhaps to accept) that conclusion, given that its premisses are reasonable to accept. 
To conceive of good arguments and inferences as those which justify their conclusions in 
such ways is to adopt the idea that good arguments are entitlement-preserving arguments. To 
adopt such a conception is to model or ground argument appraisal on epistemology rather than 
on logic as traditionally conceived.2 
Two arguments are offered in support of the contention that the virtues of good defeasible 
inferences cannot be understood without invoking terms of epistemic appraisal. Though these 
two arguments may fall short of offering conclusive reasons for shifting from a truth-preserving 
approach to an entitlement-preserving approach, they provide sufficient motivation for 
investigating the potential such a shift in our approach to argument virtue might have. 
 
4. THE FORM OF WARRANTS REVISITED: AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT BASED ON 
FEATURES OF TOULMIN’S TREATMENT OF ARGUMENTS 
 
The paper identifies six features of Toulmin’s account of arguments and warrants which, in my 
view, any account of warrants should incorporate or make provision for. 
In light of these six features, I sketch a quick, preliminary account of the form that 
warrants or rules of inference should take. The form is generated by enhancing a Hitchcock-type 
 
1
 By “showing that such-and-such” I do not have in mind “providing grounds for concluding that such-and-such”, 
but rather making it manifest that such-and-such is the case. Presenting an argument for a proposition makes it 
apparent that it is reasonable to accept that proposition because in presenting the argument one brings to light the 
considerations that make it reasonable to accept that proposition. Recall Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying 
and showing in the Tractatus. 
2
 Because logic as traditionally conceived studies the truth-preserving potential of arguments, even attempts at 
developing inductive and non-monotonic logics, I think it is fair to say, focus on truth-preserving potential. 
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covering generalization so that, for a given argument, we get a formula that looks roughly like 
this: 
W3 (S)(x) If it is reasonable for S to supposei that x is F then it is reasonable for S to supposej 
that x is G. 
In this formula, ‘suppose’ is employed as a generic term for positive doxastic attitudes,3 and the 
subscripts ‘i' and ‘j’ signal that different “species” of supposing can be referenced in the 
antecedent and consequent. For example, being reasonably certain that someone is a clergyman 
might make it reasonable to expect that he believes in God (without making it reasonable to be 
certain that he does). In my telling, a functional account of the doxastic attitudes is presupposed 
– an account in which doxastic attitudes are type-identified in terms of the role they accord their 
propositional contents within our cognitive economy. 
 
5. WHAT VIRTUES SHOULD WARRANTS HAVE? 
 
The concluding part of the paper explores the question of what makes a warrant a good or 
acceptable warrant. Following Toulmin, I suppose that acceptable warrants are reliable 
warrants. But of course (a) ‘reliable’ is itself already a term of appraisal (it means fit to be relied 
upon) and (b) invoking reliability is not much help until we spell out what reliability consists in. 
A brief account of the reliability of warrants is offered, whose principal points are these. 
A warrant endorses an inferential practice, and endorses it under a particular description. A 
warrant is reliable if and only if the inferential practice it endorses is reliable (fit to be relied on). 
An inferential practice is reliable if its outcomes regularly (a) serve the purposes that have 
prompted us to rely on that inferential practice in the first place4 and (b) do so in the 
circumstances under which we rely on that practice (as, for example, the practice of calculating 
gravitational forces using Newton’s inverse square law yields outcomes that serve the purposes 
of most engineers and physicists in the circumstances under which they rely on that practice). As 
a result, the reliability of an inferential practice is highly sensitive to the purposes – many of 
them non-epistemic purposes – that prompt reliance on inference. Moreover, the reliability of an 
inferential practice depends on objective likelihoods. But an objective likelihood can only be 
calculated with respect to a reference class.5 The appropriate reference class for determining the 
objective likelihood of successful outcome must be fixed by the typical circumstances in which 
an inferential practice has been or will be relied upon. As a result, though the reliability of the 
 
3
 We could make the form of warrant more general still if we (i) permit more than one attitude to be mentioned in 
the antecedent and (ii) admit propositional attitudes other than doxastic attitudes into the position occupied by 
supposing and its species– that is to say, admit things such desiring it to be the case that, intending that, fearing that 
to occur where supposing occurs. For example, we could then treat the following as a warrant: If it is reasonable for 
someone to desire that X be the case and to suppose that by doing A he/she could make X the case, then it is 
reasonable for that person to intend to do A. Warrants of this sort would enable us to accommodate the points made 
in my 1990 paper “Generalizing the notion of argument,” reprinted as chapter 2 of Pinto (2001). 
4
 Recall that the outcome of inferential practices as conceived here is the adoption of one or another positive 
doxastic attitude toward a propositional content. An outcome may be deemed successful if adopting that attitude was 
appropriate and did no harm, even though the propositional content in question happens to be false. The upshot of a 
good inductive inference with a false conclusion might be considered successful, so long as the attitude adopted 
toward the false conclusion was an appropriate one and adopting it did not have significant negative consequences. 
5
 Compare Brandom’s use of a similar point in his assessment of reliability theories of perceptual knowledge – for 
example in chapter 3 of Brandom (2000). 
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practice of expecting that a man believes in God when we know he is a clergyman will depend 
on an objective likelihood, the objective likelihood on which it depends need not coincide with 
the objective likelihood that a man is a believer given that he’s a clergyman. What will matter 
will be the objective likelihood (a) of arriving at an appropriate doxastic attitude (b) when 
relying on the practice in the typical circumstances in which it has been or will be relied upon. 
The upshot of these points is an account which makes the “authority” of warrants depend 
in part on the non-epistemic values of those whose reasoning is to be evaluated by reference to 
them, and makes the reliability of warrants highly context-sensitive. For these two reasons it 
might be called a pragmatic account of the authority of warrants. But the position defended is not 
a “subjectivism” about warrants, since it makes the authority of warrants depend on objective 
likelihoods. And because the position carefully distinguishes between entitlement-preserving 
rules and truth-preserving rules, it can embrace a pragmatism about rules without embracing a 
pragmatist account of truth. 
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